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This paper presents the first MIMIC (multiple indicator multiple causes) model estimate of 
the size and development of the shadow economy and of do-it-yourself (DIY) activities in 
Germany from 1970 to 2005. By 2005, they reached a level of about 17% and 4.94%. While 
the shadow economy has regularly increased over the years, DIY activities – though quite 
sizeable – have remained more or less constant since the early 1990s. The driving forces for 
the shadow economy are regulation and tax burden whereas for DIY activities, the level of 
unemployment is the main factor. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Shadow economic and DIY activities are a fact of life around the world. Do-it-
yourself activities are generally seen as something positive and creative while 
the shadow economy is treated differently – that is, in a much more negative 
way. Most societies attempt to control the shadow economy through punishment 
or by relying on “official” economic growth or on education. Very often, 
shadow economic and DIY activities are seen as substitutes (e.g. if it is too risky 
to demand shadow economic activities, I only undertake DIY ones) or as 
complements (since I am capable of doing certain things, and if I do it myself it 
goes more quickly, I do not need to demand all services in the shadow 
economy.) Both types of activity are seen as a way to mitigate financial 
constraints (I can save money if the official economy is too expensive). The 
magnitudes at which shadow economic and DIY activities occur are not only 
important for academics, but also for politicians and the public. Gathering such 
statistics requires accurate information about who is engaged in the shadow 
economy and DIY activities and the frequencies with which these activities 
occur. It is difficult to obtain such information because individuals engaged in 
shadow economic activities do not readily volunteer details about these 
activities. Measuring DIY activities, however, is no less challenging as this is 
also a neglected area and has not been officially measured so far.
4  
 
Consequently, the estimation of the shadow economy and of DIY activities 
becomes a scientific passion to know the unknown. Although quite a large 
amount of literature on particular aspects of the shadow economy as well as a 
                                                 
4 First, pioneering measurements of do-it-yourself activities have been undertaken by 
Karmann (1990) where some elementary hypotheses on shadow economy and do-it-yourself 
activities causes were derived, and a simple empirical demand-sided analysis was undertaken.   
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comprehensive survey exist, the subject remains controversial.
5 Moreover, the 
authors are not aware of any studies which try to simultaneously estimate both 
the shadow economy and DIY activities. The major goal of this paper, therefore, 
is to provide such an estimation as well as to track the development of the 
shadow economy and DIY activities in Germany from 1970 to 2005. Further 
goals are to consider the impact of German reunification on shadow economic 
and DIY activities, to employ a proper estimate of domestic currency in 
circulation within Germany as an indicator variable for the shadow economy, 
and finally, to examine how sensitive these results are and how robust the 
(latent) estimation procedure – in this case the MIMIC model – is.  
 
Chapter 2 provides a short review of hitherto existing estimates of the German 
shadow economy. It also defines the shadow economy and DIY activities and 
proposes theoretical considerations as to why people turn to shadow economic 
and DIY activities. Chapter 3 presents the empirical results, starting with the 
causal and indicator variables, followed by the econometric estimation result of 
the MIMIC models and, finally, the size and development of the shadow 
economy and of DIY activities in Germany. Chapter 4 summarizes and draws 
some policy conclusions. In the appendices, sources of the data used are 







                                                 
5 See Frey and Pommerehne (1984), Thomas (1992), Loyaza (1996), Pozo (1996), Lippert and 
Walker (1997), Schneider (1994a,b, 1997, 1998a,b, 2003, 2005), Johnson et.al. (1997, 
1998a,b), Belev (2003), Gerxhani (2003), and Pedersen (2003). For surveys of evidence, see 
Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002), Schneider (2003) and Alm et.al. (2004).  
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2. Some Theoretical Considerations 
 
2.1. Short Literature Review 
 
Existing estimates of the German shadow economy (measured in percentage of 
official GDP) are shown in Table 2.1.
6 The oldest estimate uses the survey 
method of the Institute for Demoscopy in Allensbach, Germany and shows that 
the shadow economy was 3.6% of official GDP in 1974. In a much later study, 
Feld and Larsen (2005) undertook an extensive research project using the survey 
method to estimate shadow economic activities in the years 2001 and 2004.
7 
Using the officially paid wage rate, they concluded that these activities reached 
4.1% in 2001 and 3.1% in 2004. Using the (much lower) shadow economy wage 
rate, however, these estimates shrink to 1.3% and 1.0%, respectively. If we look 
at the discrepancy method, for which we have estimates from 1970 to 1980, the 
German shadow economy is much larger: using the discrepancy between 
expenditure and income, we get approximately 11% for the 1970s, and using the 
discrepancy between official and actual employment, roughly 30%. The 
physical input methods where estimates for the 1980s are available deliver 
values of around 15% for the second half of that decade. The (monetary) 
transaction approach developed by Feige (1996) places the shadow economy at 
30% between 1980 and 1985. Yet another monetary approach, the currency 
demand approach – the first person to undertake an estimation for Germany was 
Kirchgässner (1983, 1984) – provides values of 3.1% (1970) and 10.1% (1980). 
Kirchgässner’s values are quite similar to the ones obtained by Schneider and 
Enste (2000, 2002), who also used a currency demand approach to value the size 
of the shadow economy at 4.5% in 1970 and 14.7% in 2000. Finally, if we look 
                                                 
6 A similar table can be found in Feld, Schmidt and Schneider (2007). 
7 In our paper there is no extensive discussion about the various methods to estimate the size 
and development of the shadow economy, also we do not discuss the strength and weaknesses 
of each method. Compare for this Schneider and Enste (2000), Schneider (2005), Feld and 
Larsen (2005), Pedersen (2003), and Giles (1999a,b,c).  
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at latent (DY)MIMIC estimation procedures, the first ones being conducted by 
Frey and Weck-Hannemann in 1984, and later, Schneider and others followed 
for Germany, again, the estimations for the 1970s are quite similar. Furthermore, 
Schneider’s estimates using a DYMIMIC approach (Schneider (2005, 2007)) are 
close to those of the currency demand approach.  
 
Thus, we can see that different estimation procedures produce different results. 
It is safe to say that the figures produced by the transaction and the discrepancy 
approaches are rather unrealistically large: the size of the shadow economy at 
almost one-third of official GDP in the mid-1980s is most likely an 
overestimate. The figures obtained using the currency demand and hidden 
variable (latent) approaches, on the other hand, are relatively close together and 
much lower than those produced by other methods (i.e. the discrepancy or 
transaction approaches). This similarity is not surprising given the fact that the 
estimates of the shadow economy using the latent (MIMIC) approach were 
measured by taking point estimates from the currency demand approach. Still, 
what is lacking is a consistent estimate of the shadow economy and of DIY 
activities. This is the goal of our paper.  
DoityourselfGermany2007_6.doc   6  of  46 
Table 2.1 
The Size of the Shadow Economy in Germany According to Different Methods (in Percentage of Official GDP)  
Shadow economy (in percentage of official GDP) in:  Method 
1970 1975  1980  1985  1990 1995 2000  2005 
Source 
- 3.6 
1)  -  -  -  -  -  -  IfD Allensbach (1975) 




- -  -  -  - -  1.3 
3) 1.0 
3) 
Feld and Larsen (2005) 
Discrepancy between expenditure 
and income 
11.0  10.2  13.4  -  -  -  -  -  Lippert and Walker (1997) 
Discrepancy between official and 
actual employment 
23.0 38.5  34.0  -  -  -  -  -  Langstedt  (1983) 
Physical input method  -  -  -  14.5  14.6  -  -  -  Feld and Larsen (2005) 
Transactions approach  17.2  22.3  29.3  31.4  -  -  -  -   
3.1 6.0 10.3  -  -  -  -  - Kirchgässner  (1982) 
12.1  11.8  12.6  -  -  -  -  -  Langfeldt (1983, 1984) 
Currency demand approach 
4.5  7.8  9.2  11.3  11.8  12.5  14.7  -  Schneider and Enste (2000) 
5.8  6.1  8.2  -  -  -  -  -  Frey and Weck (1984) 
-  -  9.4  10.1  11.4  15.1  16.3  -  Pickardt and Sarda (2006) 
Latent ((DY)MIMIC) approach 
4.2 5.8 10.8 11.2 12.2  13.9  16.0 15.4  Schneider  (2005,  2007) 
Soft modelling  -  8.3 
4) -  -  -  -  -  -  Weck-Hannemann  (1983) 
1) 1974. 
2) 2001 and 2004; calculated using wages in the official economy. 
3) 2001 and 2004; calculated using actual “black” hourly wages paid. 
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2.2. Defining the Shadow Economy and DIY Activities 
 
Most authors attempting to measure the shadow economy face the difficulty of 
how to define it. One commonly used working definition is all currently 
unregistered economic activities that contribute to the officially calculated 
(observed) Gross National Product.
8 Smith (1994, p. 18) defines it as, “market-
based production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal that escapes 
detection in the official estimates of GDP”. One of the broadest definitions 
includes “those economic activities and the income derived from them that 
circumvent government regulation, taxation or observation”.
9 As these 
definitions still leave a lot of questions open, Table 2.2 is helpful for developing 















                                                 
8 This definition is used for example, by Feige (1989, 1994), Schneider (1994a, 2003) and 
Frey and Pommerehne (1984). For early, demand-sided estimates of the shadow economy and 
do-it-yourself activities for Germany see Karmann (1990). 
9 This definition is taken from Del’Anno (2003), Del’Anno and Schneider (2004) and Feige 
(1989); see also Thomas (1999), Fleming, Roman and Farrell (2000).  
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Table 2.2 
A Taxonomy of Types of Economic Activities
1) 
Type of activity  Monetary transactions  Non-monetary transactions 
Illegal activities  Trade in stolen goods, drug 
dealing and manufacturing, 
prostitution, gambling, smuggling, 
fraud, etc.  
Barter of drugs, stolen goods, 
smuggling, etc., production or 
growing of drugs for own use, 
theft for own use. 
  Tax evasion  Tax avoidance  Tax evasion  Tax avoidance 






















1) Structure of table taken from Lippert and Walker (1997, p. 5) with additional remarks. 
 
From Table 2.2, it becomes clear that a broad definition of the shadow economy 
includes unreported income from otherwise official trade in goods and services, 
e.g. through monetary or barter transactions – and thus includes all economic 
activities that would generally be taxable were they reported to governmental 
(tax) authorities. In this paper, the following, more narrow definition of the 
shadow economy is used:
10 the shadow economy includes all market-based, 
lawful trade in goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public 
authorities for one of the following reasons:  
 
(1) to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes; 
(2) to avoid payment of social security contributions; 
                                                 
10 Compare also the excellent discussion on the definition of the shadow economy in Pedersen 
(2003, pp.13-19), who uses a similar one.  
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(3) to avoid having to meet certain legal labour market standards, such as 
minimum wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc.; or, 
(4) to avoid compliance with certain administrative procedures, such as 
filling in statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms. 
 
Similarly, DIY activities include all market-based goods and services which are 
produced do-it-yourself in order to avoid gross wage payments, including taxes 
and social security contributions, in the official economy or to avoid any net 
wage payments in the shadow economy. It is important to note, however, that 
the main difference between DIY and shadow economic activities is that the 
former are entirely legal. 
 
This paper shall not deal with typical, underground criminal activities, such as 
burglary, robbery, drug dealing, etc., which are all illegal. Rather, this paper 
investigates neglected shadow economic and lawful DIY activities in order to 
estimate their size. The term hidden economy is always used when considering 
the combined sector of shadow and do-it-yourself activities. 
 
2.3. Main Causes of Shadow Economic and DIY Activities 
 
2.3.1. Tax and Social Security Contribution Burdens 
 
Studies point to tax and social security burdens as one of the main reasons for 
the existence of the shadow economy.
11 Since taxes affect labour-leisure choices 
as well as stimulate labour supply in the shadow economy, the distortion of the 
overall tax burden is a major concern for economists. The greater the difference 
between the total cost of labour in the official economy and the after-tax 
                                                 
11 See Thomas (1992); Lippert and Walker (1997); Schneider (1994a,b, 1997, 1998a,b, 2000, 
2003); Johnson et.al. (1998a,b,); Tanzi (1999); Giles (1999a); Mummert and Schneider 
(2001); Giles and Tedds (2002), Giles et.al. (2002) and Dell’Anno (2003).  
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earnings from work is, the more incentive people have to avoid this difference 
by working in the shadow economy. The studies of Schneider (1994b, 2000) and 
Johnson et.al. (1998a, 1998b) provide statistically significant empirical evidence 
of the influence of tax burdens on the shadow economy. The strong influence of 
indirect and direct taxation on the shadow economy is further demonstrated 
through the empirical results in Austria and the Scandinavian countries 
(Schneider (1986), (1994 a, b)). In contrast to shadow economic activities, the 
effect of tax burdens on DIY activities is more ambiguous as higher taxation 
may also drive up prices for do-it-yourself goods, thereby making do-it-yourself 
work more costly. This effect may countervail the distortion effect on official 
labour supply. 
 
2.3.2. Intensity of Regulation 
 
The intensity of regulation (often measured by the amount of laws and 
regulations, such as license requirements, or by the size of staff at regulatory 
agencies) is another important factor. An increase reduces the freedom (of 
choice) for individuals engaged in the official economy.
12 Examples would be 
labour market regulations, trade barriers, and labour restrictions on foreigners. 
Johnson et.al. (1998b) find significant empirical evidence of the influence of 
(labour) market regulations on the shadow economy. The impact is also clearly 
described and theoretically derived in other studies, for example in the findings 
of the Deregulation Commission 1990/91 (Germany). Regulations lead to a 
substantial increase in labour costs in the official economy, but since most of 
these costs can be shifted onto employees they provide an incentive to work in 
the shadow economy – where they can be avoided. 
 
 
                                                 
12 For a (social) psychological, theoretical foundation of this feature, see Brehm (1966, 1972), 
and for a (first) application to the shadow economy, see Pelzmann (1988).  
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Obviously, the higher the unemployment is, the higher the incentive to be 
engaged in DIY activities. Unemployed people have less money for purchasing 
goods and services and therefore a higher incentive to engage in DIY activities. 
Additionally, DIY activities may enhance the unemployed’s self-esteem, thereby 
further stimulating DIY activities. 
 
(2) Average gross hourly earnings 
 
It is also apparent that the higher the average gross hourly earnings in the 
“official” small trade sector are, the higher the costs are for people who demand 
such services. Given that people have the ability to do these activities 
themselves, we postulate that higher average gross hourly earnings lead to an 
increase in the volume of DIY activities, ceteris paribus. 
 
(3) Real disposable income 
 
Since real disposable income is positively correlated to demand for goods and 
services in general, we hypothesize that the higher the real disposable income is, 
the greater the demand not only in the official but also in the unofficial economy 
is and hence the larger the shadow economy is.  
 
2.3.4. Summarizing our Hypotheses 
 
After defining the shadow economy and DIY activities and providing some 
theoretical considerations on why people work in the shadow economy or are  
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engaged in DIY activities, we would like to reiterate our hypotheses. Because it 
is not clear whether shadow economic and DIY activities can be treated as 
complements or substitutes – they may have both functions under different 
circumstances – we do not formulate any hypotheses about the interaction 
between these activities. Instead, we undertake the first (to our knowledge) 
proper attempt to simultaneously estimate the shadow economy and DIY 
activities according to the following hypotheses: 
 
(1) An increase in tax and social security burdens increases shadow 
economic and DIY activities, ceteris paribus. 
(2) The more the German economy is regulated, the greater the incentive is 
to work in the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. 
(3) The higher the unemployment in Germany is, the more people engage in 
DIY activities, ceteris paribus. 
(4) The higher the total wage cost in the official economy is, the more people 
undertake DIY activities, ceteris paribus. 
 
2.4. Indicator Variables of Shadow Economic and DIY Activities 
 
The MIMIC estimation procedure assumes that cause variables influence the 
shadow economy whereas indicator variables reflect shadow economic 
activities. In addition to the variables which contribute to the size and 
development of the shadow economy, we have four indicator variables that 
reflect shadow economic activities themselves.  
 
The first indicator variable is the domestic currency in circulation, i.e. cash 
outside the banking system in the form of coins and banknotes that can be 
physically held in the hand. This amount of currency is typically used for day-
to-day expenses but also for shadow economic activities.   
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Here, we formulate the following four hypotheses: 
 
(5) The larger the shadow economy is, the more currency (measured in real 
currency) there is in circulation, ceteris paribus. 
 
If the official real GDP growth rate is low, the incentive to engage in the shadow 
economy rises. In other words, the lower the level of official activity is, the 
fewer possibilities people have to earn more money or to obtain employment in 
the official economy. For this reason, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
(6) The lower the growth rate of real GDP is, the larger the shadow economy is, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
On the other hand, the reverse causation could also hold true, i.e. the higher the 
economic growth, the larger the shadow economy. One explanation is that if the 
official economy grows, the shadow economy may grow as well since 
favourable conditions for economic growth apply for both the official as well as 
the unofficial economy and especially since additional goods purchased (e.g. 
cars) in the official economy lead to a demand in maintenance and other services 
in the shadow economy.  
 
The average hours worked per week in the official economy is also an important 
indicator for shadow economic activities. The more people work in the official 
economy, the less time they have to be engaged in the shadow economy. We 
therefore formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
(7) The more people work – measured by the average hours worked per week – 
in the official economy, the smaller the shadow economy is, ceteris paribus.  
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Do-it-yourself activities are best reflected in the estimated real turnover in DIY 
stores. Thus, we formulate our last hypothesis: 
 
(8) The greater the amount of DIY activities is, the higher the estimated real 
turnover in DIY stores is, ceteris paribus. 
 
3. Empirical Results: the Hidden Economy in Germany 
 
3.1. Data Sources 
 
Our data cover the period 1970 to 2005 on an annual basis. All data except that 
on tax and social security contributions, on domestic currency in circulation, and 
on turnover in DIY stores are taken from the Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany. The latter were made available by A.C. Nielsen Company GmbH and 
cover 1978 to 2005. The estimated growth rates from 1970 to 1977 are used to 
predict the level of turnover in DIY stores for this period. For the approximation 
of tax and social security contribution burdens, we use public revenue data 
provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). The main components are income tax, value added and sales taxes, 
social security contributions, and payroll taxes.  
 
Data on domestic currency in circulation are taken from the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. From the 1950s to 2001, DM-denominated currency in circulation 
outside the banking system greatly increased and cannot be examined on the 
basis of domestic transactions in the official and unofficial economies alone. 
One possible explanation is the rise in foreign demand for the Deutsche Mark 
during that time.
13 The bulk of foreign demand in the 1990s stemmed from 
                                                 
13 Seitz (1995).  
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Eastern and Southeast Europe after the breakdown of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (COMECON) system. Unstable political circumstances in 
the early 1990s, the war in Kosovo, and the Bulgarian Financial Crisis of 
1996/1997 increased foreign demand for the Deutsche Mark further. Given that 
we are interested in shadow economic and DIY activities in Germany only, it is 
essential to focus on domestic currency demand as an indicator variable for the 
shadow economy. For this reason, we exclude foreign demand for the Deutsche 
Mark from the total amount of currency in circulation (provided by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank) and instead use the methodology proposed by Seitz (1995) to 
assess domestic demand for currency in circulation. We then apply this 
methodology both to take German reunification into account and to adjust for 
the distortion in domestic currency in circulation during the second half of 2001 
as a result of the public’s preparation for the introduction of the Euro (in 2002). 
At that time, people substituted cash with demand deposits in order to avoid 
personally exchanging their Deutsche Mark for Euros.
14 This triggered an 
enormous decrease in domestic currency in circulation which cannot be 
attributed to changes in shadow economic or DIY activities. The details of our 
estimation procedures are provided in subsections 5.2. and 5.3 of the Appendix, 
which also provides a complete list of data sources in Table 5.1. 
 
Before proceeding, we shall test our data for stationarity. The results are 
discussed in the next subsection. 
 
3.2. Unit Root Tests 
 
Applying MIMIC models
15 with nonstationary time series may result in 
misleading estimates. To overcome this problem and to avoid spurious 
                                                 
14 Deutsche Bundesbank (2002). 
15 One of the first studies using this approach over time was that of Aigner, Schneider and 
Ghosh (1985), who estimated the shadow economy of the United States.  
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regressions, we conduct the Phillips and Perron (PP) unit root test
16 to check for 
the presence of a unit root in a particular times series. For the series in levels, an 
intercept and a time trend are included. The Schmidt-Phillips unit root test as 
proposed by Schmidt and Phillips (1992) is employed to cross check the 
presence of a unit root. Table 5.2 in the Appendix displays the results. In all 
cases, except for the variable average gross hourly earnings (Wages) – where 
both tests show inconsistent results – we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a 
unit root at the 5% significance level. As a result, we treat the variables as I(1) 
and differenced them once to achieve stationarity. In this case, we employ the 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) test
17 to cross check the 
results from the PP test. For most variables, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of stationarity at the 5% significance level. Only for the variables Income and 
Reg are the values of the test statistic slightly greater than the 5% critical value. 
As the time series for the turnover in DIY stores (Tdiy) remains nonstationary 
even after taking first differences, the approach suggested by Schwert (1987) is 
employed to detrend the time series of the variable Tdiy successfully. Because 
of the limited sample size, the lag order is set to two. The findings from our unit 











                                                 
16 Phillips and Perron (1988). 
17 Kwiatkowski et al. (1992).  
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Table 3.1 
Results of Unit Root Tests for the Variables Used 
  PP test  KPSS test 
Variable  Test statistic Lag length  Test statistic Lag length 
Curr  -3.5121 6 0.3840 2 
Grgdp  -4.0100 1 0.1869 1 
Hours  -3.0728 1 0.1358 4 
Income  -4.5613 2 0.5149 3 
Inf  -5.2178 6 0.0562 3 
Reg  -4.7745 0 0.6024 2 
Tdiy 
(first  difference)  -1.4123 0 0.4460 2 
Tdiy 
(detrended) -5.3301 2 0.0687 1 
Tbur  -3.6901 0 0.4460 2 
Unemp -3.5503  11  0.3979  2 
Wages  -4.1005 2 0.4521 4 
The order of the autoregressive correction for both tests was chosen using the 
Bartlett kernel estimator and the Newey-West (1994) data-based automatic 
bandwidth parameter method. All regressions include an intercept but no time 
trend. The critical values for the PP test – taken from MacKinnon (1996) – 
are: -3.64 (1% level), -2.95 (5% level), and -2.61 (10% level). The LM 
statistics critical values of the KPSS test – taken from Kwiatkowski et al. 
(1992) – are: 0.7390 (1% level), 0.4630 (5% level), and 0.3470 (10% level).  
 
 
Table 3.2 presents a detailed description of the variables ultimately used in the 
MIMIC models as well as all data transformations carried out to achieve 
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Table 3.2 
Variables Used in the MIMIC Model 
Variable used  Description of the variable used 
Indicator variables 
Curr  First difference of the natural logarithm of the level of real domestic 
currency in circulation as estimated in section 5.2. 
Grgdp  Growth rate of real GDP. 
Hours  First difference of the natural logarithm of the average hours worked per 
week. 
Tdiy  Detrended natural logarithm of the real turnover in do-it-yourself stores 
as explained in section 5.3. 
Causes variables 
Dummy  One for the years 1991 and 1992 to cover impulse effects in the 
differenced variables as a result of German reunification, null else. 
Income  First difference of the natural logarithm of the per capita real disposable 
income in Germany. 
Inf  First difference of the natural logarithm of the ratio of current year's CPI 
to previous year's CPI. 
Reg  First difference of the ratio of the number of people employed in public 
service (excluding people employed by railways and the postal service, 
which were previously state-run) to total population. 
Tbur  First difference of the per capita public revenues for Germany. 
Unemp  First difference of the natural logarithm of the number of unemployed 
people. 
Wages  First difference of the natural logarithm of the average gross hourly 
earnings of male workers in the small trade sector. 
 
 
As a result of data transformation, the model is estimated in first differences and 
thus provides estimations of latent variables in first differences only. 
Consequently, we must integrate the resulting time series in differences to obtain 
the index series for the shadow economy (S), DIY and the hidden economy 
spectrum (H). 
 
3.3. MIMIC Models 
 
Our estimation of the shadow economy and of DIY activities is based on two 
alternative model specifications. The first (S-DIY) model considers shadow 
economic and DIY activities as two distinct latent variables that will be 
estimated simultaneously in a MIMIC model. Following our earlier hypotheses,  
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we use the variables measuring both tax and social security contribution burdens 
as well as the intensity of regulation as the main elements to describe shadow 
economic activities. Do-it-yourself activities, however, are best explained 
through unemployment, tax and social security contribution burdens, and 
average gross hourly earnings. Despite the ambiguous theoretical effect of 
higher inflation on the shadow economy and on DIY activities, we consider 
inflation as a causal variable for the latent variables in our MIMIC models. 
Since inflationary pressure lowers nominal tax burdens, we expect increasing 
inflation to have a negative impact on the amount of both shadow economic and 
DIY activities. Furthermore, we use a dummy variable (Dummy) to control for 
structural changes of the German economy and impulse effects on the data as a 
result of German reunification in 1990. The conceptual diagram of the S-DIY 
model is shown in Figure 3.1.  
 
 



















Growth rate of 
real GDP 
(Grgdp) 
Real turnover in 
do-it-yourself 
stores (Tdiy) 
Average gross hourly 
earnings (Wages) 
Tax and social 
security burden 
(Tbur)  
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To confirm the S-DIY model, we estimate a second (H-DIY) model 
specification. In this H-DIY model, the hidden economy spectrum, H, is 
estimated using the same causal variables used for the estimation of the shadow 
economy in the S-DIY model. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, DIY activities are 
then determined by the causal link between latent variables and are measured as 
a percentage of the overall hidden economy. The size of the shadow economy is 
derived by subtracting DIY activities from the hidden economy. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2 Conceptual Diagram of the H-DIY MIMIC Model 
 
Since S is a decisive part of H, all indicator variables used for S must also be 
considered for H. Hence, the same set of indicator variables is employed in both 
model specifications.  
 
As indicators of the shadow economy, we use the growth rate of real GDP 
(Grgdp), the estimated domestic currency in circulation (Curr), and the average 
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DIY stores in Germany (Tdiy) as a particularly suitable indicator. The results of 
both MIMIC model estimations, applying the maximum likelihood estimator for 
the S-DIY model as well as for the H-DIY model are shown in Table 3.3. For 
each model specification, the first column shows the parameter estimates for 
both causal as well as indicator variables for S and H. The parameter estimates 
relating to DIY activities are displayed in the second column. The last two rows 
in Table 3.3 refer to the causal link between H and DIY in the H-DIY model. 
 
The following summarizes our findings from the estimation of the presented 
MIMIC models and addresses our proposed hypotheses. 
 
(1) The intensity of regulation is always highly statistically significant and is 
positively related to S and H, having the expected sign. 
(2) Tax and social security contribution burdens are statistically significant 
different from zero for S as well as for H and are, as expected, positively 
related to both latent variables. We cannot confirm that the tax burden is a 
driving factor for the public to engage in DIY activities. 
(3) In both model specifications, the variable Income, which measures per capita 
real disposable income, is highly statistically significant and positively 
related to S and H. One possible explanation is that the higher the disposable 
income of households, the higher the demand for goods and services. 
Demand rises not only in the official economy but also, in part, in the shadow 
economy, leading to a higher observed level of shadow economic activity. 
This implies that both sectors are complementary to each other. 
(4) The variable Inf is statistically different from zero for DIY activities only; 
that is, the inflation rate influences DIY activities and has a negative sign. As 
was previously mentioned, it is not clear from the literature whether inflation 
appears with a positive or negative sign. With a negative sign, a possible 
interpretation is that the higher the inflation rate – which makes raw materials  
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for DIY activities more expensive – the fewer activities individuals perform, 
leading to a lower level of the latent variable DIY. The negative, though 
insignificant, influence of inflation on shadow activities, given all other 
causal factors, may be seen as contributing to a reduction in real tax burdens, 
thereby reducing incentives to avoid taxation. 
(5) The dummy variable which measures the impact of German reunification in 
1990 is positively related to both shadow economic and to DIY activities, as 
well as to the hidden economy spectrum. The variable is always highly 
statistically significant, has the expected sign, and reflects the catching up 
process after the reunification of both economies. 
(6) The unemployment level is an important factor in DIY activities. The 
variable, Unemp, is positively related to the respective latent variable and has 
the expected sign. 
(7) In our MIMIC models, hourly earnings in the small trade sector, measured by 
the variable Wages, do not influence do-it-yourself activities since the 
relationship between the variable Wages and DIY is not statistically different 
from zero. Nevertheless, the parameter estimate has the expected sign, 
showing that higher wages lower the demand for small trade services and 
hence raise the incentives for the public to engage in DIY activities. 
 
With regard to the indicator variables, we fix one indicator for each latent 
variable. For the shadow economy, we choose the variable Curr. For the latent 
variable indicating DIY activities, we opt for the variable Tdiy. For the two 
remaining indicators, we obtain the following results: 
 
(8) The estimated coefficient on the Grgdp indicator variable is statistically 
different from zero and hence suggests a positive relationship between the 
shadow economy and the growth rate of real GDP.   
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(9) For the second indicator variable, Hours, we cannot confirm that the size of 
the shadow economy affects the average hours worked per week. The 
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0.13** 
(2.05) 
T-statistics appear in parenthesis. * = significance at 10% level, 
** = significance at 5 % level, *** = significance at 1% level. 
 
 
In order to estimate not only the relative size but also the levels of our latent 
variables, it is necessary to fix a scale for each latent variable used. A 
convenient albeit somewhat arbitrary way is to set the coefficient of one  
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indicator variable of the measurement model to non-zero, thereby simplifying 
examination of the relative magnitude of the other indicator variables.
18 We set 
the coefficient of the variable Curr to one since the size of the shadow economy 
is measured in monetary units. Because we are dealing with two latent variables 
simultaneously, it is also necessary to fix the other unobserved variable, DIY. 
Our decision to set the coefficient of the indicator variable Tdiy to two is based 
on the following theoretical consideration:
19 capital productivity measures the 
ratio of output to capital input, indicating the value added in a specific business 
sector. Since we employ the capital input of DIY activities, i.e. turnover in DIY 
stores, as an indicator for the unobserved variable DIY, i.e. the output, the use of 
capital productivity as a fixed parameter seems to be appropriate. Assuming that 
the value added in the construction business is nearly equal to that of DIY 
activities, we choose an approximate value of capital productivity for the 
construction business in 1991 (the approximate mid-point of our observation 
period). According to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, capital 
productivity in the construction business was 1.89 in 1991. 
 
As Table 3.3 also shows, all variables except Hours and Tbur are significant at 
the 5% significance level for both S as well as for H. With regard to the latent 
variable DIY, only the variable Tbur is not statistically significant. We also 
estimate both model specifications but exclude the insignificant variables. The 
parameter estimates, nevertheless, remain stable, as can be seen from the last 
column of Tables 5.3 and 5.4 in the Appendix. In addition, we employ 
robustness checks by varying the observation period. Again, parameter estimates 
remain rather stable (see Table 5.3 and Table 5.4). The test statistics 
representing the overall fit of the S-DIY and H-DIY models and the 
parsimonious model specifications excluding the insignificant variables are 
displayed in Table 3.4. 
                                                 
18 Giles and Tedds, 2002, p. 109. 
19 For similar arguments see also Karmann (1990).  
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Table 3.4 
Summary Statistics of the Estimated MIMIC Model 
  Full model  Parsimonious model 
 S-DIY  H-DIY  S-DIY  H-DIY 











Root mean squared 
error of 
approximation 
(RMSEA) 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
P-value for test of 
close fit 
(RMSEA < 0.05)  0.9800  0.7300  0.9800  0.9500 
Root mean square 
residual (RMR)  0.0003  0.0005  0.0003  0.0006 
Standardized RMR  0.087  0.12  0.087  0.095 
Goodness of fit index 
(GFI) 0.85  0.84  0.84  0.92 
Adjusted goodness of 
fit index (AGFI)  0.80  0.78  0.79  0.88 
Parsimony goodness 
of fit index (PGFI)  0.64  0.62  0.64  0.62 
 
 
Overall, the global goodness of fit statistics of the various model specifications 
show satisfactory statistical properties. Nevertheless, for the S-DIY model, the 
statistics of the full model indicate a slightly closer fit compared to the 
parsimonious one whereas for the H-DIY model, the reverseis true. To assure 
comparability between the estimates of both the S-DIY and the H-DIY model, 
we always use the full model specifications to predict the size of shadow 
economic and DIY activities in Germany from 1970 to 2005. We refrain from 
displaying the global goodness of fit statistics for robustness checks with 
variations in the observation period since they do not differ much from those of 
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3.4. Size of the Shadow Economy and of DIY Activities 
 
One difficulty of MIMIC model estimations is that the obtained ordinal series 
needs to be converted into a cardinal series. In the literature, this is usually done 
by calibration using an absolute level of the estimate at a particular time within 
an observation period. Since we employ the first differences of the variables in 
the MIMIC models, the latent variable is estimated under the same 
transformation. In order to obtain the actual values of the shadow economy and 
DIY activities as a percentage of official GDP, an a priori known value is 
required. This can be done by using the average of estimates from a number of 
other studies (Schneider and Enste, 2000). One can also identify such a 
benchmark, however, by estimating a cardinal series through some other 
approach, for example, the cash demand approach (Giles and Tedds, 2002). In 
this paper, we refer to the estimate obtained by Karmann (1990) for the size of 
DIY activities in Germany since it is (to our knowledge) the only estimate that 
exists. To be consistent with the results obtained in this study, we also take the 
estimate for the size of the shadow economy from Karmann (1990). Thus, we 
apply the shadow economy estimate of 8.5% and the DIY estimate of 4.4% to 
scale up our ordinal series. Both benchmark point estimates refer to 1983. The 
complete cardinal series we identify are shown in Figures 3.3-3.5. Figure 3.3 
plots the size and development of the shadow economy according to the S-DIY 
model. It shows a remarkable increase in the shadow economy over the past 25 
years, reaching 17.40% of official GDP in 2005. German reunification in 1990 
triggered a steep rise in the shadow economy during the reconstruction period 
that followed. After East Germany caught up to West Germany’s behavioural 
patterns, growth in the shadow economy slowed down considerably to the 
current level of around 17%.  
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Fig. 3.3 Shadow Economy in Germany in Percentage of GDP (1990:2005) 
 
 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the estimated size and development of DIY activities under 
the S-DIY model specification. Do-it-yourself activities as a percentage of 
official GDP increased from 4.05% in 1970 to 4.94% in 1995 and remained 
more or less stable through 2005. Like shadow economic activities, DIY 
activities also experienced a big push following German reunification – even 
though the dynamics were not as pronounced. On the whole, between 1970 and 
2005, DIY activities grew more slowly than did the shadow economy. 
 
  









1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
 
Fig. 3.4 DIY Activities in Germany in Percentage of GDP (1970:2005) 
 
 
When calculating the size and development of shadow economic and DIY 
activities in Germany according to the H-DIY model, we obtain similar results. 
As Figure 3.5 shows, DIY activities ranged from 3.87% (1970) to 4.99% (2005) 
whereas the shadow economy increased from 1.63% (1970) to 16.11% (2005). 
Accordingly, the benchmark value for the H-index is simply derived by adding 
the a priori known values for the shadow economy and for the DIY activities 
taken from Karmann (1990). As a result, our benchmark for the hidden economy 
in 1983 is 12.9% of official GDP. All estimates of the different index series 
according to the S-DIY and the H-DIY model are shown in Table 5.5 in the 
Appendix. 
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Fig. 3.5 Time Path of the Different Indices According to the H-DIY Model in 
Percentage of GDP (1970:2005) 
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4. Summary and Conclusions  
 
In this paper, we have used a latent estimation approach, here, a MIMIC model, 
to provide the first consistent estimate of the size and development of the 
shadow economy and of DIY activities in Germany. In addition, we found a 
highly statistically significant influence of regulation as well as tax and social 
security contribution burdens on the shadow economy. For DIY activities, we 
observed a highly statistically significant positive influence of unemployment. 
In general, the estimated MIMIC model shows satisfactory statistical properties. 
According to our calculations the German shadow economy increased from 2% 
in 1970 to 17% in 2005. These results are very similar to those obtained by 
Schneider (2005) using the currency demand approach (compare table 2.1). Do-
it-yourself activities amounted to 4% of official GDP in 1970, increased to 
4.94% in 1995, and remained relatively constant till 2005. Taking both sectors 
together, we see that the hidden economy in Germany reached a remarkable size 
of more than 20% of official GDP in 2005.  
 
What type of policy conclusions can we draw from these results? 
 
(1) The simultaneous and consistent estimation of conjoint shadow economic 
and DIY activities yields values of 16% of official GDP for the former 
and 5% of official GDP for the latter for the past 4-5 years. 
(2) If one wants to reduce the shadow economy and/or DIY activities, our 
results indicate that fewer regulations and lower tax and social security 
contribution burdens might be the two most efficient means of shifting 
more activity into the official economy. Reducing both the intensity of 
regulation and the amount of contributions to the social security system 
in Germany might also result in a lower level of unemployment. This 
would reduce the public’s incentive to engage in DIY activities.  
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(3) Though our results should be regarded as first steps in measuring the size 
of the hidden economy, we have demonstrated that both shadow 
economic and DIY activities are important and should be taken into 
account when seeking to stimulate the official economy through policy 
measures.  
  








Variable Data  source 
CPI  Federal Statistical Office of Germany 
Curr  Deutsche Bundesbank, own calculations 
GDP  Federal Statistical Office of Germany 
Grgdp Own  calculations 
Hours  Federal Statistical Office of Germany 
Income Deutsche  Bundesbank 
Inf Own  calculations 
Reg  Federal Statistical Office of Germany, own calculations 
Total population  Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Thomsen Financial 
Datastream) 
Tdiy  A.C. Nielsen Company GmbH, own calculations 
Tbur  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) 
Unemp  Federal Statistical Office of Germany 
Wages  Federal Statistical Office of Germany, own calculations 
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Table 5.2 
Unit Root Tests for the Time Series in Levels 
  PP test  Schmidt-Phillips test 
Variable  Test statistic Lag length  Test statistics Lag length  q l  
Curr -1.6614  2  -1.6453  3 
     -1.6827  9 
Hours -1.3969  4  -1.3356  3 
     -1.5648  9 
Income -1.7008 0 -1.7062 3 
     -1.6475  9 
Inf -2.8782  1  -2.4181  3 
     -1.4623  9 
Reg -0.6600  6  -1.2617  3 
     -1.4921  9 
Tdiy -1.0553  4  -1.1893  3 
     -1.4762  9 
Tbur -1.0229  3  -1.7221  3 
     -1.7460  9 
Unemp -2.5858 2 -2.7828 3 
     -1.5601  9 
Wages -4.8518 1 -0.4709 3 
     -0.5398  9 
The order of the autoregressive correction for the PP test was chosen 
using the Bartlett kernel estimator and the Newey-West (1994) data-
based automatic bandwidth parameter method. All regressions for the PP 
test include an intercept and a time trend. The critical values for the PP 
test – taken from MacKinnon (1996) – are: -4.24 (1% level), -3.54 (5% 
level), and -3.20 (10% level). The suggestion for the choice of the lag-
length in the Schmidt-Phillips test is to use 
4 / 1 ) 100 / (T q lq = , where 
4 = q  or  12 = q , which results in a lag-length of 3 and 9, respectively. 
The critical values for this test – tabulated in Schmidt and Phillips 
(1992) – are: -3.55 (1% level), -3.02 (5% level), and -2.75 (10% level). 
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Table 5.3 
Robustness Checks S-DIY MIMIC Model 
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(0.46)    
T-statistics appear in parenthesis. * = significance at 10% level, ** = significance at 5 % level, *** = significance at 1% level. 
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Table 5.4 
Robustness Checks H-DIY MIMIC Model 
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T-statistics appear in parenthesis. * = significance at 10% level, ** = significance at 5 % level, *** = significance at 1% level 
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Table 5.5 
Size of the Hidden Economy, the Shadow Economy and of DIY Activities (in Percentage of 
GDP) (1970:2005) 














1970  4.02 5.50 -0.04 1.63 3.87 4.05 
1971  4.92 6.16 0.86 2.24 3.92 4.07 
1972  5.95 7.08 1.88 3.10 3.98 4.07 
1973  6.71 7.57 2.60 3.55 4.02 4.11 
1974  7.48 8.17 3.28 4.11 4.06 4.20 
1975  8.34 8.97 4.09 4.85 4.12 4.25 
1976  9.16 9.76 4.88 5.59 4.17 4.28 
1977  9.84  10.37  5.56 6.15 4.22 4.28 
1978  10.65  11.17  6.35 6.90 4.28 4.30 
1979  11.52  11.88  7.27 7.55 4.33 4.25 
1980  12.11  12.28  7.85 7.93 4.36 4.25 
1981  12.43  12.45  8.14 8.09 4.37 4.29 
1982  12.58  12.54  8.23 8.17 4.37 4.35 
1983  12.90  12.90  8.50 8.50 4.40 4.40 
1984  13.66  13.60  9.24 9.15 4.45 4.42 
1985  14.23  14.10  9.80 9.61 4.49 4.43 
1986  15.01 14.92 10.54 10.38  4.55  4.47 
1987  15.61 15.44 11.14 10.86  4.58  4.47 
1988  16.03 15.77 11.59 11.16  4.61  4.44 
1989  16.47 16.03 12.08 11.41  4.62  4.39 
1990  17.31 16.78 12.90 12.10  4.68  4.42 
1991  19.03 18.24 14.42 13.45  4.78  4.61 
1992  20.44 19.50 15.60 14.63  4.87  4.84 
1993  20.56 19.56 15.68 14.68  4.88  4.87 
1994  21.05 20.05 16.15 15.13  4.91  4.91 
1995  21.26 20.25 16.32 15.32  4.93  4.94 
1996  21.46 20.40 16.51 15.46  4.94  4.96 
1997  21.44 20.33 16.48 15.40  4.93  4.96 
1998  21.76 20.65 16.79 15.69  4.96  4.97 
1999  22.29 21.12 17.31 16.13  4.99  4.97 
2000  22.56 21.30 17.61 16.29  5.00  4.94 
2001  22.48 21.23 17.54 16.23  5.00  4.94 
2002  22.46 21.23 17.50 16.23  5.00  4.96 
2003  22.63 21.39 17.66 16.38  5.01  4.97 
2004  22.48 21.23 17.51 16.23  5.00  4.96 
2005  22.35 21.10 17.40 16.11  4.99  4.96 
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5.2. Domestic Demand for Currency in Circulation in Germany 
 
The Goldfeld (1973) equation provides the analytical background for our 
approach. In equilibrium, real money demand is assumed to depend on real 
income and the level of short term interest rates. In countries with weak national 
currencies, however, two or more sound currencies are often used 
simultaneously as means of payment and as store of values. Like Seitz (1995), 
we take this fact into account and include the EUR/USD exchange rate to reflect 
both the relative strength of the Euro over the US-Dollar as well as the 
observation that both currencies are close substitutes in such countries. Dummy 
variables for the first and second quarter of 1991 are used to control for the 
impact of German reunification. 
 
To predict the level of domestic currency in circulation, we apply a vector error 
correction model using the methodology developed in Johansen (1991, 1995) to 
detect cointegrating relations. Our data are on a quarterly basis from Q1 1970 to 
Q4 2005. The variable GDP, measuring real income, is expressed in logarithm. 
The data for currency in circulation and for the short term interest rate are taken 
from the Deutsche Bundesbank. Data for the German quarterly GDP and for the 
EUR/USD exchange rate are from Thomson Financial Datastream. All variables 
are found to be I(1). Applying the Johansen cointegration test for the long run 
part of the vector error correction model, we find one cointegration equation at 
the 5% significance level for the four variables under consideration. In order to 
achieve stationarity for the short run, we then difference all variables once. The 
results of the unit root tests as well as of the Johansen cointegration test are 
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Table 5.6 
Currency in Circulation 
  PP unit root test 
Variable  Variable in levels  First difference 
















Cointegration test   
Trace test  54.3611 
(0.0108)   
Maximum eigenvalue  30.0971 
(0.0233)   
The order of the autoregressive correction for the PP unit root test was 
chosen using the Bartlett kernel estimator and the Newey-West (1994) 
data-based automatic bandwidth parameter method. All regressions 
for the PP test in levels include an intercept and a time trend. The 
critical values – taken from MacKinnon (1996) – are: -4.02 (1% 
level), -3.44 (5% level), and -3.15 (10% level). For the first difference 
of the variables, the test includes an intercept only. Here, the critical 
values (also from MacKinnon (1996)) are: -3.48 (1% level), -2.88 (5% 
level), and -2.58 (10% level). The 5% critical value for the trace and 
maximum eigenvalue tests are 47.86 and 27.58, respectively, and are 
taken from MacKinnon et al. (1999). 
 
 
The vector error correction model allows us to determine the level of domestic 
currency in circulation in accordance with the economic conditions in Germany 
from 1970 to 2005. Hence, we adjust the total amount of currency in circulation 
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank by the fraction circulating abroad. Figure 
5.6 shows the outcome. 
  








1970Q2 1975Q2 1980Q2 1985Q2 1990Q2 1995Q2 2000Q2 2005Q2
Currency in circulation Estimated currency in circulation
 
Fig. 5.6 Currency in Circulation in Billions of Euros (1970:2005) 
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5.3. Extrapolation of Turnover in German DIY stores  
 
Because the A.C. Nielsen Company GmbH conducted the first annual survey on 
turnover in DIY stores in Germany in 1978, completing the time series for the 
entire period 1970-2005 requires estimation of the turnover for the missing 
years. To do this, we first calculate the annual growth rates (Grtdiy) as the first 
difference of the natural logarithm of the initial time series. We then simply 
regress the obtained growth rates on a constant term and on time. Table 5.7 
shows the results of this estimation. 
 
Table 5.7 
Regression of Grtdiy on a constant and on time  
Variable  Grtdiy 
Parameter estimates 
Constant  0.2119*** 
(0.0000) 
Time  -0.0082** 
(0.0000) 
Test statistics 




Unit root tests   
PP test  -6.3697 
KPSS test  0.0827 
The order of the autoregressive correction for both unit root 
tests was chosen using the Bartlett kernel estimator and the 
Newey-West (1994) data-based automatic bandwidth 
parameter method. All regressions for the PP test include an 
intercept and a time trend. The critical values for the PP test – 
taken from MacKinnon (1996) – are: -4.37 (1% level), -3.60 
(5% level), and -3.24 (10% level). The LM statistics critical 
values of the KPSS test – taken from Kwiatkowski et al. 
(1992) – are: 0.2160 (1% level), 0.1460 (5% level), and 
0.1190 (10% level). 
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Finally, we use the estimates to predict and integrate annual growth rates of 
turnover for the years 1971 to 1978. A graphical representation of turnover in 
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Fig. 5.7 Turnover in DIY stores in Billions of Euros (1970:2005) 
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